Sudan’s Gold Economy Is Fueling a Regional Security Challenge

Wed July 01 2026

· Egyptian authorities detained hundreds of people — 87 Egyptians and 136 foreigners — and seized large amounts of equipment last week in a sweeping operation targeting illegal gold mining and smuggling along its border with Sudan.

· Both the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces had been heavily involved in the gold trade prior to the breakout of the Sudan war, however, the current conflict has exacerbated gold’s role within Sudan’s political economy as a driver of the conflict.

· Artisanal small-scale gold mining (ASGM) has emerged as a top security, environmental, and public health concern within the region.

· The regional consequences of artisanal small-scale gold mining are increasingly pronounced as illicit gold flows intersect with broader transnational trafficking networks involving arms, narcotics, and human movement.

Egyptian authorities detained hundreds of people — 87 Egyptians and 136 foreigners — and seized large amounts of equipment last week in a sweeping operation targeting illegal gold mining and smuggling along its border with Sudan. These arrests have cast renewed attention on the illicit gold economy that has been critical in funding the ongoing civil war in Sudan between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Since the conflict began in 2023, Cairo has reinforced security along its 1,276-kilometer border with Sudan as it continues to confront illegal mining and cross-border smuggling, while absorbing hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees who have fled from one of the world’s most dire humanitarian crises. Analysts warn that expanding illicit mining networks, many operating under the protection of armed militias and cartels, are placing growing pressure on border security in North and East Africa and raising fears that continued instability in Sudan could create a security vacuum exploited by the Sudanese militias, as well as terrorist networks like, African affiliates of al-Qaeda and Islamic State, from other regions within Africa that may see a window of opportunity.

Gold has long been central to Sudan’s economy. Following South Sudan’s independence in 2011, Sudan lost most of its oil reserves and turned to gold as its primary driver of revenue. Both the SAF and RSF had been heavily involved in the gold trade prior to the breakout of the civil war, however, the current conflict has exacerbated gold’s role within Sudan’s political economy as a driver of the conflict. As state institutions collapsed and formal banking channels deteriorated, the RSF and SAF turned to gold mining and smuggling as a main tactic to finance military operations and sustain patronage networks. The RSF and SAF still both compete to maintain and expand their control of gold production as a source of revenue and power.

According to Africa Defense Forum, gold production accounted for 70 percent of Sudan’s national revenue from 2023-2025. However, Sudanese finance minister Gibril Ibrahim stated at only 20 out of 74.6 metric tons of gold produced in 2025 were exported through official channels. Additionally, a report by Chatham House stated that artisanal small-scale gold mining (ASGM) accounts for the largest output of total gold production. The RSF mostly deals in this type of gold mining, as opposed to the SAF, which also has access to state-controlled gold mining sites. Due to the RSF’s historic ties to Arab tribes along the South Sudan border and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti)’s familial ties to ASGM sites in South Sudan, the RSF has been deeply entrenched in the ASGM sector for years.

The RSF has consolidated control over key-gold producing areas in North and South Darfur and North and West Kordofan and has leveraged its control over transport corridors across Darfur and Kordofan to facilitate the movement of gold to enter informal export networks. These networks provide the RSF with hard currency used to finance military operations and procure weapons, mostly from the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

However, the implications of ASGM extend beyond revenue generation. As the war has expanded and displaced civilians have lost access to agriculture and formal employment, ASGM has become one of the only viable economies across large parts of the country. According to Yale Environment 360 magazine, two million people are believed to be active in the ASGM sector in Sudan. With little oversight or regulation, people working in these mines face conditions conducive to exploitation, forced labor, and recruitment by armed groups. Additionally, the mercury and cyanide used in the extraction process has generated environmental degradation — seeping into water supplies and changing the chemical composition of the soil, leading to the loss of vegetation — and serious health hazards, like inhaling mercury gas.

Sudan’s gold economy ultimately lies in the illicit networks that move production beyond its borders. Weak governance, porous borders, and entrenched smuggling routes allow the flow of gold through Egypt, Chad, Libya, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic before entering international markets. Investigations, including by the UN, have repeatedly identified the United Arab Emirates as a leading destination for Sudanese gold exports, although the full scale of illicit flows remains difficult to quantify due to opaque supply chains. Particularly, the RSF’s control over western and northern trade corridors positions it in an ideal location for these cross-border flows, linking extraction zones directly to smuggling routes. These transnational networks facilitate sanctions evasion, money laundering, and informal tax revenue, while depriving the Sudanese people of revenue critical for public services and infrastructure.

The regional consequences of this system are increasingly pronounced as illicit gold flows intersect with broader transnational trafficking networks involving arms, narcotics, and human movement. These dynamics compound the difficulty of external efforts to confront the role of ASGM within the informal economy. Sudan does not possess the capacity, at present, to challenge this system, as the RSF and SAF have every incentive to maintain the status quo, as formalization would threaten the very revenue streams sustaining their war effort. The result is a mining sector that remains structurally vulnerable, with little prospect of the oversight mechanisms that might otherwise limit its exploitation.

For regional and international observers, the concern lies in the underlying conditions — ungoverned territory, displaced and economically desperate populations, and access to a lucrative commodity that is easily exploited — that have enabled the RSF and SAF’s foothold, and the prospects for it to expand. The arrests in Egypt reflect a growing recognition among Sudan’s neighbors that the war economy could spill across borders and reshape regional security dynamics. The arrests show an effort by Egypt not only to curb illegal mining but also contain broader spillover effects including organized crime and smuggling networks. Similar pressures may emerge across other neighboring states like Chad, which historically has had ties to the RSF, but has recently attempted to distance itself from the paramilitary group. States may also be concerned that a spillover of the war economy could attract terrorist and criminal groups from other regions aiming to further exploit current conditions.

Source: https://thesoufancenter.org/